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Grounding Aesthetic Preference in the Bodily
Conditions of Meaning Constitution
Towards an Enactive Approach
 
Alfonsina Scarinzi
a bstr act   Mark Johnson’s work The Meaning of the Body presents John 
Dewey’s pragmatism and pragmatist aesthetics as the forerunners of the anti­
Cartesian embodied enactive approach to human experience and meaning. 
He rejects the Kantian noncognitive character of aesthetics and emphasizes 
that aesthetics is the study of the human capacity to experience the bodily 
conditions of meaning constitution that grows from our bodily conditions of 
life. Using Mark Johnson’s view as a starting­point, this paper offers the be­
ginning of an enactive approach to aesthetic preference contributing to bring­
ing human aesthetic behavior research closer to the enactive approach to 
human experience. Following enactive studies on bodily sense­making and 
embodied emotions, I identify the bodily conditions of meaning constitution 
in which aesthetic preference is grounded with the subject’s self­regulatory 
visceral embodied constitution of viable degrees of value of the environmen­
tal factors according to her bodily structure. Unlike mainstream aesthetic 
preference research in empirical aesthetics, I claim that the subject’s aesthetic 
preference constitution requires the lived experience of the bodily conditions 
of meaning constitution through the conscious experience of the subjectively 
aroused lived body. The implausibility of the mind/body dichotomy of cur­
rent aesthetic preference research is highlighted.
k ey wor ds  Pragmatist aesthetics, enactivism, Mark Johnson, John Dewey, 
embodiment, lived body, phenomenology
Introduction
Because of its alleged noncognitive character, nothing connected with the aes-
thetic can have any role in meaning, conceptualization and reasoning!1
In his work The Meaning of the Body Mark Johnson comments with these 
words on the reasons for the devaluation of aesthetics in mainstream 
Anglo-American analytical philosophy and philosophy of language. These 
two strands of philosophy consider aesthetics as not being part of mean-
ing proper because the aesthetic dimension of experience and thought is 
neither conceptual nor propositional. Johnson points out that the influ-
ential aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant has also contributed to relegate 
aesthetics to a secondary and devaluated status in philosophy and science. 
Kant adopts the mind-body dualism of Enlightenment faculty psychology, 
in which feeling as bodily occurrence is contrasted with thought as intel-
lectual cognitive process, and reduces aesthetics to feeling alone consid-
ered to be nonconceptual and incapable of giving rise to knowledge.2
Alfonsina Scarinzi
84
In his work, Johnson rejects the noncognitive view of aesthetics and 
the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy that underlies it. Drawing upon John 
Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics and his “somatic naturalism”,3 he claims 
that aesthetics is the study of everything that goes into the human capac-
ity to make and experience the bodily pre-linguistic cognitive, emotional 
and sensory-perceptual conditions of meaning constitution having its 
origins in the organic activities of living creatures and in their organism-
environment transactions.4 It underlies linguistic meaning, which is par-
asitic on it. Following Dewey, Johnson points out that the paradigmatic 
case of these pre-linguistic bodily conditions of meaning constitution is 
meaning-making in art. They culminate in aesthetic experience, which 
is not sharply marked off from other experiences. According to Dewey, 
an aesthetic experience is the integration of all the elements of ordinary 
experience that gives the experience a larger feeling of wholeness in the 
interactive flow of organism-environment transactions.5 The continuity 
of aesthetic experience with normal processes of living modifies and 
sharpens our perception and communication. As Richard Shusterman, 
in his analysis of Dewey’s work Art as Experience, puts it, drawing an 
analogy between Dewey and Merleau-Ponty, the expressive perceptual 
role of the lived body is amplified in aesthetic experience, even if Dewey 
himself does not use this phenomenological notion.6 
In his work, Johnson brings pragmatism and consequently also the 
pragmatist view of aesthetics closer to the rising enactive mind thesis 
or enactivism.7 Enactivism conciliates phenomenology and cognitive sci-
ence, acknowledging that especially the phenomenological studies on 
the lived body can clarify and guide scientific research on subjectivity 
and consciousness.8 The enactive mind thesis rejects the Cartesian mind/
body dichotomy and emphasizes the anti-representationalist view that 
the mind is embodied and distributed over body, brain and environment. 
Accordingly, cognition depends on the individuals’ bodily possibilities 
of action and sensorimotor skills. The backdrop against which action 
and cognition in the environment as well as experience take place is 
the pre-reflective dimension of the perceptual and cognitive-emotional 
lived body.9 In enactivism living beings are considered to be autonomous 
and active agents. They follow laws set up by their own activity (auto-
poiesis). The organism-environment transactions are possible thanks to 
the agent’s coupling with the environment in a relation of co-determina-
tion. By such a coupling, agents actively generate their identity by select-
ing from the environment their viable world, called “cognitive domain”, 
that is brought forth or enacted by that agent’s autonomous mode of cou-
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pling with the environment. In the process of bringing forth the cogni-
tive domain self-regulatory preferences and hence bodily viable degrees 
of values of environmental factors in the interactive flow of organism-
environment transactions are constituted.10 
The truly embodied enactive nature of aesthetics, which Johnson ac-
knowledges in his reevaluation of the field, has been marginalized by 
mainstream human aesthetic behavior research. As the field of aesthetic 
preference research shows, it has adopted the disembodied dualistic ap-
proach of classical cognitive science for studying the sensory-perceptual 
bodily character of aesthetics.11 In mainstream research on human aes-
thetic behavior the notion of aesthetic preference is defined as the sub-
ject’s choice to focus her selective attention on certain features of every-
day objects or of works of art in their sensory perception which leads to 
positive emotions and aesthetic pleasure.12 This can be induced by per-
ceptions that do not arouse strong emotions such as a sunset, a painting, 
a car, an elegant mathematical proof, or a piece of music, as Martindale 
and Moore point out.13 An aesthetic preference may be expressed in a 
propositional form in the following way: I like X or I prefer Y. 
The aim of this article is to begin developing an enactive approach to 
aesthetic preference, contributing in this way to do justice to the truly 
embodied enactive nature of aesthetics. I will discuss the enactive bodily 
mediated perceptual and cognitive-emotional ground of aesthetic pref-
erence; I will not deal with its linguistic propositional form. I contend 
that aesthetic preference constitution as a vehicle of aesthetic pleasure 
requires the lived experience of the bodily conditions of embodied mean-
ing constitution through the conscious experiential access to the subjec-
tively lived body. I argue that ‘the aesthetic’ of an aesthetic preference is 
characterized by a feeling of wholeness which is similar to the one that 
according to Dewey characterizes an aesthetic experience. I argue that its 
emergence can be experienced through the cognitive-emotional evalua-
tion of the aroused lived body. 
In what follows, I first propose an overview of the existing models 
in aesthetic preference research, putting into focus the implausibility 
of their dualistic disembodied approach and proposing to recast the re-
search questions of the aesthetic preference research field in enactive 
terms. I then turn to the enactive approach and develop the idea that 
against the background of the enactive approach to the bodily conditions 
of meaning constitution, aesthetic preference can be grounded in the 
subject’s embodied visceral viable degrees of value of the environmen-
tal factors she encounters in the organism-environment transactions. 
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Finally, I emphasize the role of the embodied enactive interdependence 
of cognition and emotion14 in the bodily mediated experience of ‘the aes-
thetic’ as a felt pleasurable quality of an aesthetic preference.
An Overview of the Dualistic Disembodied Models in Aesthetic Preference 
Research and their Implausibility
Aesthetic preference research has become a field of inquiry especially 
of empirical aesthetics and psychology of aesthetics. The arousal-based 
model or preference-for-novelty model by Daniel Berlyne, the preference-
for-prototype-model by Colin Martindale and Kathleen Moore and the 
MAYA-model by Paul Hekkert and colleagues, which postulates a prefer-
ence for neither too novel nor too prototypical stimuli, are well-known. 
The stubborn focalization of the research field on the properties of en-
vironmental stimuli as predictive factors of aesthetic preference that in-
trinsically motivate people to seek and to process information is also 
well-known. It has led the field to reduce aesthetic preference research to 
the never ending and sterile debate on whether novelty or prototypical-
ity or a balance between them determines human aesthetic preference. 
In spite of their lack of potential for the future development of aesthetic 
preference research and human aesthetic behavior, in what follows I will 
illustrate the mentioned models with the purpose of emphasizing the im-
plausibility of their dualistic disembodied theoretical basis. This has not 
been tackled in the literature so far. Discussing the dualistic implausibil-
ity of the mentioned models is necessary now, for developing an enactive 
approach to aesthetic preference requires recasting the theoretical prem-
ises of the research field. In this section I will put into focus the pragma-
tist implausibility of the existing models. Also their phenomenological 
implausibility will be highlighted, for phenomenology is a constitutive 
part of enactivism and the development of an enactive approach to aes-
thetic preference within Johnson’s project of reevaluation of aesthetics 
requires coping with two phenomenological issues: the lived body and 
lived experience, even if Johnson in his work does not take the road of 
phenomenology in spite of its relevant role in enactivism. 
To my mind, the most limiting shortcoming of the dualistic existing 
models for investigating aesthetic preference is the lack of attention to 
the process of how mind and body, cognition and emotion, make con-
tact in aesthetic preference constitution. While all three models take the 
subject’s bodily sensory-perception of stimulus features into account, 
the question of its relation with emotion15 and cognition, as well as the 
relation between emotion and cognition, is tackled in a partial and un-
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satisfactory way or it is not tackled at all. This prevents the field from 
studying aesthetic preference as part of the flow of human experience in 
the subject’s active interaction with the environment. It reduces aesthetic 
preference research to the observation of stimulus-response dynamics, 
neglecting the fact that the subject’s action and behavior are the first 
cause of all exposure to stimuli and that the subject and the environment 
are in a relation of co-determination, as Merleau-Ponty observes in The 
Structure of Behaviour,16 and as also enactive research indicates.
Berlyne’s Disembodied Model
The arousal-based model by Berlyne17 inspired by behaviorism elimi-
nates mind entirely. In line with behaviorism that considers the mind to 
be a black box and hence unapproachable, Berlyne neglects it and focuses 
on the lawful relation between input (stimuli) and behavior (outputs). 
His approach is akin to positivist objectivism in science and does not 
take the subjective experience of one’s own body into account. For this 
reason it can be considered to be a disembodied model.18 Berlyne hypoth-
esizes that in the perception of an object, preference for any stimulus 
is determined by its arousal potential. Arousal is a bodily event. It is 
a general state of the organism that affects the organization of its be-
havior between one extreme, for example sleep, and the other extreme, 
for example disorganization.19 The relationship between preference and 
arousal potential is described by the Wundt curve: stimuli with medium 
arousal potential are most selected by human attention. As arousal po-
tential increases to this medium level, preference increases from neutral-
ity to maximal liking. Further increases in arousal potential leads to a 
decline in liking and to increasing degrees of displeasure. The arousal 
potential of a stimulus is determined by its psychophysical properties 
(physical qualities of the stimulus such as intensity, brightness, pitch), 
ecological properties (learned meaningfulness of a stimulus) and col-
lative variable properties such as novelty, complexity and incongruity. 
Collative variables refer to the comparison of a stimulus with a prior 
expectation. With Berlyne’s words: “the word ‘collative’ […] adverts to 
the fact that, in order to decide how novel, surprising, complex, and so 
on, a pattern is, one must compare or collate information from two or 
more sources.”20 The collative variables and the arousal potential are the 
two classes of concepts that are believed to allow us to make predictions 
about emotional responses. These are simply explained with reference 
to the broader hedonic effects of complexity and novelty and hence to 
their arousal potential. The problem with this view is that bodily arousal 
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is undifferentiated and cannot support any specific emotion. In order to 
acquire emotional specificity, arousal has to be labeled through appraisal 
as a cognitive process of interpretation of bodily events.21 But Berlyne’s 
approach lacks a theory of emotion that can account for the emotional 
specificity of arousal. The only thing that arousal in Berlyne’s model al-
lows to predict is enjoyment and aversion and hence simple positive and 
negative states as possible physical reactions, so that aesthetic preference 
remains a matter of the body alone.
The Disembodied Model by Colin Martindale and Kathleen Moore
The alternative to Berlyne’s model is the preference-for-prototype model 
developed by Colin Martindale and Kathleen Moore and colleagues.22 
They prefer to focus on the role of cognition, while arousal and appraisal 
that constitute emotion are eliminated completely. This model is disem-
bodied because it does not take emotional bodily events into account. In 
line with the mind/body dichotomy, the authors cling to the view that 
feeling and emotions belonging to the body can overshadow cognition 
belonging to the higher faculty of the mind. Accordingly, the cognitive 
effects of any pleasurable stimulus that activates a mental representation 
would be completely overshadowed by emotions. Nevertheless, they do 
not leave aside the bodily excitatory nature of a stimulus. They propose 
the cognitive model of preference-for-prototype for explaining the cogni-
tive patterns and consequences of aesthetic preference constitution as 
response to a perceptual stimulus. 
According to the preference-for-prototype model, the most influent 
determinant or predictive factor of aesthetic preference is stimulus pro-
totypicality. Aesthetic preference is determined by the extent to which 
a particular stimulus is typical of its class and is positively related to 
prototypicality because typical stimuli give rise to stronger activation of 
the salient cognitive categories and mental representations. The starting-
point of the preference-for-prototype model is the connectionist view 
of the mind. This is conceived as composed of interconnected cognitive 
units with different perceptual and conceptual tasks. Martindale and 
Moore point out that cognitive units are generally connected in a lateral 
inhibitory fashion. This means that the units coding more similar things 
are closer to one another and hence more able to inhibit one another. 
Lateral connections are not considered to be excitatory. This is a charac-
teristic of vertical connections of cognitive units. A vertical connection is 
the connection between a cognitive unit and the superordinate category 
to which it belongs. For example, category exemplars are connected in 
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an excitatory fashion with the cognitive unit coding the superordinate 
category to which they belong. Cognitive units differ in how activated 
they can become. Units coding more prototypical or more frequently en-
countered stimuli are stronger than those coding atypical or infrequent 
stimuli. According to Martindale and Moore, perception, cognition and 
aesthetic preference follow the same cognitive unit activation patterns. 
An example is the perception and recognition of a face. According to the 
authors, aesthetic preference induced by a face corresponds to the activa-
tion of exactly the same set of cognitive units devoted to face perception 
and recognition. The difference consists in the fact that while perception 
and recognition have to do with exactly which cognitive units are acti-
vated, aesthetic pleasure has to do with the net amount of activation of 
these units. As cognitive units coding prototypical stimuli are stronger 
or capable of greater activation, the stimuli that they code induce more 
pleasure. The authors do not go into the details of pleasure activation.
The MAYA-Model: A Disembodied Compromise
In aesthetic preference research Berlyne’s model and the preference-for-
prototype model have given rise to the much discussed question of the 
ascendency of one model over the other.23 The MAYA-model has provid-
ed a solution.24 It has reconciled the above mentioned models with one 
another. Like the arousal-based model and the preference-for-prototype 
model, the MAYA- model does not tackle the question of how mind and 
body make contact in aesthetic preference constitution. Instead, the in-
trinsically motivating features of a stimulus are put into the foreground 
once more. The MAYA-model supports the position that both novelty 
and typicality25 will be positively related to aesthetic preference when the 
counteracting influence of these concomitant changes in the other vari-
able is controlled for. The authors’ studies show that people prefer novel 
objects as long as the novelty does not affect typicality. In other words, 
they prefer typicality given that this is not to the detriment of novelty. 
From the point of view of empirical aesthetics, the empirical results of 
the study by Hekkert and colleagues are convincing. In striking a balance 
between novelty and typicality, in trying to be as innovative as possible, 
typicality must be preserved as much as possible. As the correlation be-
tween novelty and typicality falls short from being perfect, the unshared 
variance enables the independent manipulation of these variables. But 
even if Hekkert and colleagues find a solution to the problem of the as-
cendency of Berlyne’s model and of the preference-for-prototype model 
over one another, they also reiterate once more the sterile reduction of 
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aesthetic preference to the most intrinsically motivating properties of 
the perceptual stimulus.
Recasting the Research Questions of the Aesthetic Preference
Research Field: Towards an Enactive Approach
To my mind, the consequence of the focalization of the aesthetic pref-
erence research field on the stimulus features, and on the subjects’ re-
sponses to them, has been the relegation of the subject to a passive role 
of obedience to the environment. From a pragmatist point of view such 
stimulus-centric approaches are implausible because they do not take 
into account the active engagement of the organism with its surround-
ings, which is also a phenomenological condition for perception and 
behavior. According to Dewey’s view, which resonates with Merleau- 
Ponty’s phenomenological view, the organism’s encounters with the 
stimuli of the environment are possible only by her preceding activity 
and movement which are part of a process in which an organism seeks 
to survive and grow within different kinds of environments. The mind 
emerges as part of this activity. Hence mind and body, the higher and 
the lower, are in a relation of continuity with one another and with the 
environment. In pragmatist philosophy this is better known as Dewey’s 
continuity principle.26 If we take the continuity principle into account, 
looking at aesthetic preference as a phenomenon that can be eviscerated 
from emotional bodily events or from the mind becomes implausible.
Also, in the three mentioned models, and in the studies conducted 
according to these models, the use of the third-person methodological 
approach that objectivizes the subject’s response to a stimulus feature 
contributes to reiterating the phenomenological implausibility of these 
stimulus-centric approaches, for it leaves aside the study of the role of 
the subject’s lived experience in aesthetic preference and the role of the 
subjectively lived body that allows the subject to have a conscious expe-
riential access, both to her own implicit skill for movement and motor 
intentionality, and to the subjectively pre-reflective lived felt quality of a 
situation and of experience.27 Enactive research has shown that the first-
person approach allows the subject to have access to the lived experience 
of the felt quality of an experience and to its pre-conceptual, pre-reflec-
tive dimension that is cross-modal, as the same experiential patterns can 
appear in different sensorial modalities and convey the felt quality of an 
experience.28
Reframing aesthetic preference research within Johnson’s enactive 
reevaluation of aesthetics cannot leave aside the subject’s pre-reflec-
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tive embodied dimension of meaning. What is crucial for the enac-
tive reevaluation of aesthetics and for the development of an enactive 
approach to aesthetic preference is the fact that the pervasiveness of 
pre-linguistic embodied meaning at the corporeal level of experience 
is grounded in a non conscious pre-reflective dimension which the 
subjectively lived body is involved in.29 The lived body’s unique sta-
tus as a physical object, and as a backdrop against which actions and 
experiences in the world take place, becomes vividly apparent in the 
pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness: one’s body shows itself to be a 
material thing animated from within by sensation and motility. Evan 
Thompson30 gives the well-known example of a cup of hot tea. When I 
pick up a cup of hot tea, I feel the hot smooth surface of the porcelain 
and the heat penetrating my finger, and these sensations linger for a 
time after I have put the cup back down on the table. Such bodily expe-
rience is twofold: it is the experience of physical events that relate one’s 
body to things and it is the experience of sensorial events that relate 
one’s subjectively lived body to itself.
As Todres and Galvin31 following Eugène Gendlin point out, the con-
scious experience of the subjectively lived body is the subject’s access to 
the pre-reflective dimension of experience. It is the access to a multisen-
sorial pattern of feeling that is the basis for different felt qualities or felt 
sense of a situation and for the emergence of thought and understanding.
As Johnson points out, motor intentionality and the subjective experi-
ence of the feeling of qualities of an experienced situation, enable to ac-
count for meaning as grounded in bodily experience and hence also for 
aesthetics as visceral, pre-linguistic embodied meaning-making.
In this article I argue that the subject’s conscious experiential access to 
her pre-reflective dimension of experience through her conscious experi-
ence of her subjectively lived body can allow her to become aware of the 
aesthetic as a felt pleasurable quality of an aesthetic preference. I shall 
return to this point in detail in the next section.
Against the background of enactivism, the pragmatist and phenom-
enological implausibility of current aesthetic preference research can 
be overcome only if the research questions of the field of aesthetic pref-
erence research are reformulated. Within the framework of Johnson’s 
enactive reevaluation of aesthetics, it seems to me that the following re-
search questions are promising for the future enactive development of 
the field: (1) how is aesthetic preference constituted in relation both to the 
human visceral bodily conditions of life and to the subject’s sensorimo-
tor activity in the environment?; (2) what is its function in the flow of 
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organism-environment transaction?; (3) how can the subject have access 
to the nonconscious pre-reflective embodied meaning underlying ‘the 
aesthetic’ of aesthetic preference constitution?
In the following section I will not specifically and directly answer 
these questions. Rather, I will develop the first steps towards the begin-
ning of an enactive approach to aesthetic preference constitution, start-
ing by overcoming the pragmatist and phenomenological implausibility 
of current research on aesthetic preference. Instead of attempting at evis-
cerating aesthetic preference and its sensory-perceptual bodily character 
from cognition or from emotion and emotional bodily events, I will focus 
on how mind and body make contact in aesthetic preference constitu-
tion. I will propose to introduce the enactive embodied interconnection 
of cognition and emotion, and hence the continuity between mind and 
body, to aesthetic preference research.
Grounding Aesthetic Preference in the Bodily Conditions of Meaning Con-
stitution: an Enactive View
My aim in this section is twofold. On the one hand, following enactive 
studies I will identify the process of the visceral conditions of aesthetic 
preference constitution with the process of the constitution of viable de-
grees of value the subject’s lived body enacts or brings forth in the organ-
ism-environment transactions. I will put into the foreground especially 
the role of bodily sense-making. On the other hand, I will consider the 
lived body as a locus where mind and body, cognition and emotion, make 
contact both in aesthetic preference constitution and in the subjectively 
embodied experience of the aesthetic as a felt pleasurable quality of an 
aesthetic preference. 
As Evan Thompson points out in his work Mind in Life, the lived body 
is a dynamic condition of the living body.32 One of the tasks of the en-
active approach to human cognition is to understand a lived body as a 
special kind of autonomous system, whose sense-making brings forth 
or enacts a phenomenal world.33 In this section I will put into the fore-
ground the way the enactive approach to aesthetic preference research 
can contribute to this task. In other words, I will put into the foreground 
how a subjectively lived body as a special kind of autonomous system 
and its sense-making, bring forth aesthetic preferences in the subject’s 
enactment of her phenomenal world.
I will not tackle the methodological question of the first-person ap-
proach in enactivism mentioned in the previous section.
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Aesthetic Preference, Viable Degrees of Value and Bodily Sense-Making
In the enactive literature the specific question of the process of aesthetic 
preference constitution and its embodied ground has not been discussed. 
Nevertheless, the enactive research has tackled the more general question 
of the visceral, self-regulatory preference constitution.34 Before dealing 
with the question of how the aesthetic of an aesthetic preference is expe-
rienced by the subject, I will discuss in the following the more general 
question of how the visceral ground of bodily mediated preferences is 
constituted. These can be considered to be the bodily and embodied non-
conscious ground of aesthetic preference constitution brought forth by 
the lived body. I shall return to this point in details in the next subsection.
In order to better understand the enactive conceptual tools necessary 
to develop an enactive approach to aesthetic preference constitution at 
this point, I will make a digression and will explain two enactive no-
tions which are essential to understand the visceral enactive dimension 
of the organic biological and embodied cognitive function of the sub-
ject’s preference constitution and hence to make the first step towards 
an enactive approach in aesthetic preference research. The two notions 
are adaptivity and bodily sense-making.
Adaptivity is the subject’s capacity to regulate herself with respect to the 
boundaries of her own structure and identity in the mutual and continuous 
exchanges with the environment. Adaptive processes permit the meaning-
ful distinction of events that do not put the subject’s organism directly in 
any danger. An example is the selection of more nutritive food that may be 
regulated by mechanisms that, with Di Paolo’s words, “adaptively avoid the 
activation of more serious bio-energetic regulation (such as the consump-
tion of reserves) which itself inherits a negative valence from its proximity 
to the boundary of viability”.35 Such an adaptive selection has the function 
to preserve the subject’s biological structure and identity and corresponds 
to the subject’s own particular way of realizing and regulating autopoiesis. 
But this is not sufficient to constitute a visceral preference, for the notion 
of preference implies a process of bodily sense-making in the adaptive se-
lection of environmental elements in the organism–environment trans-
actions.36 The subject’s embodied evaluation of the consequences of her 
interaction with the environment for the conservation of her identity, and 
for the expansion of her cognitive domain according to her identity and 
bodily structure, depends on the subject’s constitution of viable degrees 
of value of adaptive selections. This determines an organismic preference 
constitution and is possible thanks to bodily sense-making.37 
The core idea of bodily sense-making is that the whole organism is a 
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vehicle of meaning which is dynamically constructed by the subject hav-
ing a perspective on the world. In the interaction with and adaptation to 
the environment, bodily sense-making is the evaluation of an adaptation 
and takes place in the organism’s coupling with the environment. It has 
both the function to contribute to maintaining the organismic integrity 
of the subject (regulation) and to expand the subject’s cognitive domain 
through the active selection of viable environmental factors to be inte-
grated into the subject’s cognitive domain.
In the enactive literature the paradigmatic example of the constitution 
of degrees of value through adaptivity and bodily sense-making, and 
hence the paradigmatic example of organismic preference constitution, 
is the example of a bacterium swimming uphill in a sugar gradient as an 
organism capable of adaptivity and bodily sense-making. The sugar gra-
dient becomes a space of possibilities for the organism that establishes 
different degrees of value and hence of self-regulatory visceral preference 
according to the viability of the environmental factor for the organism’s 
bodily structure: concentration x of sugar is good, concentration y is bet-
ter, concentration z not sufficient, etc.38 
The constitution of different degrees of value is subordinated to the 
sensorimotor actions undertaken by the subject, in the case of the men-
tioned paradigmatic example the bacterium, in the environment (in the 
example above the action of the ‘swimming uphill in a sugar gradient’) 
and it is brought forth or enacted by the subject’s autonomous mode of 
sensorimotor coupling with the environment. In this sense, it is the result 
of the so called enacted viability that occurs when the degree of value and 
hence the visceral self-regulatory preference constitution simply facili-
tate the continuing integrity and integration of the organism according 
to her sensorimotor coupling with the environment. The paradigmatic 
example of the bacterium mentioned above is a useful example to clarify 
this mechanism of enacted viability. For the bacterium, both the concen-
tration x of sugar and the concentration y are viable degrees of value. But 
while concentration x of sugar is good, concentration y is better, which 
means that in the encounter with concentration x the organism’s bodily 
preference has a lower positive degree than the encounter with concen-
tration y. In other words, both of them contribute in different ways to 
bodily self-regulation and to the extension of the organism’s cognitive 
domain in enacting a phenomenal world.
As I have stressed above, the mentioned example is just a paradigmat-
ic example. What is relevant for my concern here is the principle beyond 
the biological dynamics of an organism’s adaptation. 
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In developing the first step towards an enactive approach to aesthetic 
preference constitution, I interpret such a principle in a broader way 
and apply it to the dynamics of the pre-reflective embodied qualita-
tive dimension, determining the bodily ground of an aesthetic prefer-
ence constitution. I am making the point here that in my view, the self-
regulatory organismic viable degrees of value represent the embodied 
backdrop of the felt qualitative dimension or felt quality of making the 
experience of and constituting an aesthetic preference in the organism-
environment transactions. In other words, such a backdrop represents 
the bodily condition grounded in the sense-making of the lived body 
which is necessary for constituting and feeling the qualities of an expe-
rienced aesthetic preference constitution. It corresponds to what Mark 
Johnson in his work considers to allow to account for aesthetics as vis-
ceral, pre-linguistic embodied meaning-making. In other words, it does 
justice to Dewey’s continuity principle.
Even if as far as I know the notion of ‘felt quality’39 has never been 
used in connection to the visceral viable degrees of value and hence to 
bodily sense-making as bodily meaning constitution, I would like to 
use it in this contribution to better explain my point. As it will become 
clear in the following, I will propose that the use of ‘felt quality’ is a 
bit different from the one used by Mark Johnson in his The Meaning of 
the Body, for example, for Johnson focuses mainly on qualities of body 
motion, e.g. tension has a meaning grounded in felt muscular tension; 
linearity derives its meaning from directional qualities of bodily mo-
tion.40 In the case of preference constitution, motion alone is not enough, 
even if it is one of the conditions for preference constitution. Against 
the background of the enactive explanation of bodily sense–making and 
adaptation, both motion and the conscious and nonconscious embodied 
evaluation of embodied and environmental events, play a central role 
in identifying the felt quality of aesthetic preference constitution. Such 
a felt quality is determined by the embodied viable degrees of value of 
environmental factors, which are grounded in our bodily connections 
with things and are continuously in the making via our sensorimotor 
engagements and coupling with the environment. The meaning of the 
different degrees of value is known by the subject through the combina-
tion of the nonconscious evaluation of bodily sense-making and through 
the conscious evaluation of the quality of our different lived experiences 
in the interaction with the world. For example, x is good or y is better 
derive their meaning from a bodily degree of adaptation to environmen-
tal factors, which is prepared and developed in our nonconscious bodily 
Alfonsina Scarinzi
96
self-regulatory activity and bodily sense-making, which is the source of 
their meaning, subordinated to movement, as the paradigmatic example 
of the bacterium has illustrated.
In an enactive approach to aesthetic preference constitution the non-
conscious evaluative dimension mentioned above becomes the backdrop 
against which the evaluation of the qualitative dimension of our differ-
ent encounters with different environmental factors is subjectively felt as 
a felt quality. In other words, the bodily sense-making of the lived body 
brings forth viable degrees of value, creating the visceral conditions for 
constituting and experiencing the felt quality of an enacted aesthetic 
preference in the phenomenal world. 
I will argue in the following subsection that in the case of aesthetic 
preference constitution, the felt quality with an evaluative embodied 
function is the aesthetic of aesthetic preference, which emerges through 
the conscious experiential access to the lived body. This is the locus of 
contact of cognition and emotion in experiencing the aesthetic of aes-
thetic preference constitution.
The Role of the Lived Body and the Aesthetic of Aesthetic Preference as a 
Felt Pleasurable Quality
Enactive research on cognition, emotion and the lived body has em-
phasized that emotion and cognition, or also bodily sense-making and 
emotions, are embodied and interdependent. The point I will make in 
the following, is that the consequence of conceptualizing cognition and 
emotion as embodied and interdependent in an enactive approach to 
aesthetic preference is that a viable evaluation, such as a preference or 
an aesthetic preference, is cognitive-emotional, (it cannot be eviscerated 
from cognition or emotion) and that its viability is perceivable through 
the experiential access to the aroused lived body.41 In the following sec-
tion, this idea will be developed in two interdependent steps. I will ex-
plain and use Giovanna Colombetti’s enactive study on embodied emo-
tion and sense-making42 and tie it to my conceptualization – inspired by 
John Dewey’s aesthetic experience – of the aesthetic as a felt pleasurable 
quality of an aesthetic preference.
Colombetti has stressed that at the visceral level of preference genera-
tion not only the body plays a role in sense-making and hence in cognition, 
it is also inseparable from emotion, which is essential for the evaluation 
of viable environmental factors for the subject and hence for the constitu-
tion of self-regulatory preferences. According to Colombetti’s enactive ap-
proach to emotion and bodily sense-making, bodily sense-making, which 
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is central in the constitution of degrees of value and hence in preference 
constitution, manifests itself in the experience of the aroused lived body 
and hence in experience through embodied emotions such as fear, anger, 
happiness, guilt, anguish. These are the ways the subject evaluates bodily 
sense-making.
For my concern here it is relevant to keep in mind that the above men-
tioned embodied emotions are bodily mediated cognitive-emotional 
evaluations of the bodily sense-making of an adaptation to environmen-
tal factors the organism interacts with in the environment and of their 
viability. They allow to subjectively feel the cognitive-emotional qualita-
tive dimension of the degree of value of our interaction with different 
environmental factors through the aroused lived body. 
In developing the idea of the cognitive-emotional embodied evalua-
tion, which the aroused lived body is a vehicle of, Giovanna Colombetti 
points out that, as there is no cognition without emotion and emotion 
is embodied, arousal needs no appraisal to be interpreted by the sub-
ject. The aroused body is immediately available as such to the subject’s 
experience through the evaluation of the bodily aspects of emotion as 
part of the subject’s evaluation of the experienced world.43 Bodily arousal 
subsumes the whole subject’s organism’s capacity to make sense of her 
world and is possible thanks to the lived body. Colombetti points out that 
in the same way as the pre-reflective lived body allows the experience 
of becoming aware of my body as that through which, for example, the 
experience of typing on the computer is possible, it allows to be similarly 
aware of the bodily arousal as that through which I am living the situa-
tion of an interview as anxiety provoking. 
Against this background, we can say that in the process of the cog-
nitive-emotional evaluation of and of adaptation to the environment, 
which are essential in bringing forth preferences and hence also aes-
thetic preferences, the central role of the lived body is twofold: (1) it is 
the pre-reflective backdrop against which the perceptual and motor ex-
perience is constituted, which is its classical role, traditionally studied 
in phenomenology;44 (2) it is the pre-reflective backdrop against which 
the cognitive-emotional evaluation of the experienced world takes place, 
which is its role in the enactive approach to emotion.45 
With reference to the subjectively felt qualitative dimension of the de-
grees of value of different environmental factors, this means that this 
takes place against the backdrop of both a pre-reflective motor and cogni-
tive-emotional lived body. Nevertheless, the cognitive-emotional, evalua-
tive pre-reflective dimension of the aroused lived body is the distinctive 
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backdrop against which a viable evaluation and hence a preference or 
aesthetic preference and the cognitive-emotional qualitative dimension 
of the degrees of value of different environmental factors are subjectively 
felt in the experience and perception of the world, which are subordi-
nated to motion.
I believe that reevaluating aesthetic preference research in enactive 
terms requires focusing on the subject’s conscious experiential access 
to the pre-reflective cognitive-emotional evaluation of viable degrees of 
value of environmental factors through the aroused lived body. I propose 
that through the access to this dimension the subject can become aware 
of a degree of felt viable – that is pleasurable – quality of an aesthetic 
preference as an emergent feeling of wholeness which I identify with ‘the 
aesthetic’ of an aesthetic preference. I consider it to be very similar to the 
feeling of wholeness characterizing an aesthetic experience according to 
John Dewey. 
In the following I will clarify my point by taking into account John 
Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience and its constitutive dynamics and 
drawing an analogy between this and what I refer to as the ‘aesthetic’ of 
an aesthetic preference.
In his Art as Experience, John Dewey points out that aesthetic experi-
ence is possible in a world where suspance and crisis, disturbance and 
disorder, offer the opportunity for their resolution and hence the moment 
of passage from disturbance to harmony, which is the moment of intense 
life. According to Dewey, living the enjoyment of a period of harmony 
and hence an aesthetic experience is a temporary savored sense of cul-
mination – a feeling of wholeness – because it is the beginning of a new 
relation to the environment that implies the disruption of the achieved 
equilibrium and hence a new tension between disorder or disruption 
and the search for a new harmony, which is the rhythm of organic life.46 
With reference to Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience, Shusterman 
observes that an aesthetic experience has a living beauty “because its 
own sparkling career projects the process of its dying as it lives”, as he 
formulates it.47 
In my enactive approach to aesthetic preference constitution I propose 
that the same dynamics of the pleasurable passage from disturbance 
to harmony that enables the emergence of the feeling of wholeness and 
hence of a sense of culmination characterizing an aesthetic experience, 
can be applied to the emergence of the aesthetic as a pleasurable cognitive-
emotional felt quality of an aesthetic preference. Against the background 
of enacted viability, such a quality may emerge from a similar dynamics, 
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namely from the passage from an unviable degree of value, which corre-
sponds to a situation that does not allow self-regulation and can be hence 
seen as a sort of disorder, to a viable one or also from a viable degree of 
value to a more viable one – the level of viability corresponding to a level 
of pleasurable degree of value. I believe that the conscious experience 
of the cognitive-emotional bodily conditions of this passage makes the 
experience of the felt qualitative dimension of the aesthetic as a bodily 
cognitive-emotional viable evaluation possible. It leads to the emergence 
of a feeling of wholeness. In my enactive approach, given the embodied 
and interdependent nature of emotion and cognition, the conscious bodi-
ly and bodily felt cognitive-emotional signal of the passage from x is bad 
to y is good and from y is good to z is excellent, for example, correspond 
to the passage from anxiety (low level of viability) to joy (high level of 
viability) or from joy (high level of viability) to happiness (higher level of 
viability) and hence to a situation of harmony or more harmony for the 
subject in the evaluation of the interaction with two or more different 
environmental factors. According to my enactive approach, the duration 
of the conscious cognitive-emotional bodily signal indicating the level 
of viability in the interaction with an environmental factor corresponds 
to the situation where the temporary feeling of wholeness as the bodily 
mediated experience of the felt pleasurable quality of an aesthetic prefer-
ence, in other words ‘the aesthetic’, emerges.
Contrary to an aesthetic experience where the feeling of wholeness, 
according to Dewey, is temporary and optimal as the expression of an 
attained harmony, the feeling of wholeness and of pleasure related to 
the reflective experience of the cognitive-emotional bodily conditions 
of an aesthetic preference can be but temporary and relative. As it was 
stressed, it depends on the cognitive-emotional visceral degrees of value 
against which the experience of the feeling of wholeness of an aesthetic 
preference emerges and is subjectively felt.
In other words, the degree of pleasurable (viable) value of the experi-
ence of the aesthetic of an aesthetic preference changes with the degree 
of the visceral positive value against which the pleasurable felt quality of 
the aesthetic of an aesthetic preference emerges and is subjectively felt. 
It is the bodily and embodied signal of aesthetic preference constitution.
As I have stressed above, the locus of this visceral cognitive-emotional 
viable value is the subjectively aroused lived body. Taking the enactive 
role of the cognitive-emotional aroused lived body into account, we can 
say that the experience of the temporary and relative feeling of wholeness 
of an aesthetic preference can emerge only when its cognitive-emotional 
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bodily conditions are reflectively experienced through the cognitive-emo-
tional aroused lived body. 
Such a reflective experience relates in a cognitive-emotional way the 
subjectively lived body to itself and to the enacted phenomenal world in 
the organism-environment transaction. In other words, the cognitive-emo-
tional sense-making of the lived body brings forth viable degrees of value 
creating the visceral conditions for experiencing the felt quality of an aes-
thetic preference while bringing it forth in enacting a phenomenal world.
Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to bring aesthetic preference research 
closer to the enactive approach to human experience, rejecting the mind/
body dichotomy that characterizes mainstream aesthetic preference re-
search.
Mark Johnson’s view that aesthetics is the study of the human capacity 
to experience the bodily conditions of meaning constitution that grows 
from our bodily conditions of life, has been used as a starting-point to 
reject the pragmatist and phenomenological implausibility of disembod-
ied stimulus-centric approaches to aesthetic preference and to introduce 
the role of the embodied interconnection of cognition and emotion, the 
continuity between mind and body and hence the cognitive-emotional 
role of the subjectively lived body to aesthetic preference research.
I have argued that thanks to the conscious experiential access to the 
pre-reflective cognitive-emotional evaluation of viable degrees of value 
of environmental factors, through the aroused lived body the subject 
can become aware of different degrees of the felt pleasurable quality of 
the ‘aesthetic’ of an aesthetic preference. Such a felt quality is temporary 
and relative, as it depends on the visceral viable degree of value against 
which the experience of the aesthetic of an aesthetic preference as a bodi-
ly mediated temporary and relative feeling of wholeness emerges and is 
consciously and subjectively felt.
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